ostensibly guarantee that police inform criminal suspects of these constitutional provisions and ensure that police respect suspects' rights.
Prior to Miranda, the Court articulated several tests for the admissibility of custodial confessions. In Hopt v. Utah the Court fashioned a "voluntariness test" under which confessions were presumed voluntary if made without threats or inducements. 7 This test focused on the suspect's state of mind and the trustworthiness and believability of his statement rather than on the tactics of police in eliciting the confession. 8 Later, the Court included police conduct as one of several factors to be considered in determining voluntariness. 9 In Brown v. Mississippi, the next step in its analysis of voluntariness, the Court relied on the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to reverse a conviction where the police had admitted to whipping and hanging defendants until they confessed.' 0 This new due process test forced the Court to decide whether confessions -were compelled, and thus inadmissible, through ad hoc case-by-case analysis of police tactics.
After Brown v. Mississippi, the Court vacillated between focusing on the reliability of confessions under the voluntariness test and ex-7 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). The Court stated:
[T]he presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions] , namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prejudice his interests by an untrue statement, ceases when the confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements ... or because of a threat or promise ... operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused. . .depriv [ing] him of that freedom of will or selfcontrol essential to make his confession voluntary....
Id.
8 For a full explanation of this test, see CharlesJ. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826 REv. , 1831 REv. (1987 .
9 In Ziang Sung Wan v. U.S., the Court concluded that "the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by promise or threat" but that if the facts show that a confession was obtained through compulsion applied by police officers, such conduct makes the confession inadmissible. 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924) . In Brain v. U.S., the Court held:
The rule is not that, in order to render a statement admissible, the proof must be adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a statement were voluntarily made, but...
[that] the accused was not involuntarily impelled to make a statement when but for the improper influences he would have remained silent. With this understanding of the rule, we come to consideration of the authorities ['] [actions]. 168 U. S. 532, 549 (1897) .
10 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) . The Court held:
The due process clause requires that state action ... be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the confession of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process. Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
amining the circumstances of the interrogation under due process standards.I 1 Under the due process test the Court attempted to define the process due to suspects and wanted the lower courts to closely examine the record of an interrogation to decide whether such process had been impaired.' 2 Eventually, the Court merged these two tests, combining the voluntariness test's emphasis on guarding against unreliable confessions and the due process standard's assessment of confession admitted in court proceedings.' 3 Yet this combined approach still had many of the problems of the individual tests, such as lack of uniform application of factors to be considered in the decision, little opportunity for the court to articulate clear standards of police conduct, and lack of clear guidelines for lower courts to apply in deciding the admissibility of confessions. 14 Therefore, the Court had no definitive test of whether a confession was compelled or voluntary. This confusion in application of various standards allowed, if not encouraged, police to engage in tactics on or beyond the edge of constitutional permissibility, including physical and mental abuse of suspects.' 5 The Miranda Court' 6 attempted to end this confusion in the law of admissibility of custodial confessions, by making three major rulings.1 7 First, the Court decided that informal pressures to speak can 11 Under its due process review the Court based its decisions on the premise that "the public interest requires that interrogation .
at a police station, not completely be forbidden, so long as it is conducted fairly . State v. Smith, 161 A.2d 520, 537 (1960) .
12 Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 662-63 (1966) (discussion of the Court's "difficulties in deciding just what process is due at interrogation," leaving lower courts without clear guidance as to what circumstances surrounding interrogation are relevant under due process analysis).
13 The merged "due process voluntariness standard has three possible goals: (1) ensuring that convictions are based on reliable evidence; (2) deterring improper police conduct; or (3) assuring that a defendant's confession is the product of his free and rational choice." Id. at 663-64.
14 Ogletree, supra note 8, at 1833-34.
15 See e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (police officers engaged in "lawless practices", but the defendant's collected attitude refuted the charge of involuntariness); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) (reversed conviction based on confession because defendant was "overborne" by "sustained pressure by the police"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) 19 Following closely from this definition of compulsion, the Court also held that any custodial hearing no matter how brief will involve enough pressure on'the suspect to speak to constitute compulsion. 20 By ruling that the nature of custody is compelling per se, the Court attempted to end the arbitrariness and confusion in decisions under the voluntariness and reliability tests. The third and most famous holding in Miranda is that the police must inform a criminal suspect of his rights prior to questioning.
2 ' The purpose of these warnings was to "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."
22
The Warren Court sought to protect suspects by requiring that police read suspects their rights to remain silent and to speak with counsel, thereby reducing the custodial pressures to confess and giving police incentives not to actively pressure suspects. 23 If the police wish to admit into evidence at trial any statement made by the suspect while in custody without counsel present, the State must prove the suspect "knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."
24 The Court applied the high standard of proof required for the waiver of other constitutional rights to the waiver of Miranda rights. The standard was articulated by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 2 5 Unless the government can prove compliance with the procedures required by the Court or meet the Zerbst burden of ling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively appraised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) 21 The Court also held: As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The Edwards rule thus furthers the goal of Miranda by strengthening the prohibition of coercive police tactics. One commentator has described the relationship of these two cases and their effort to control police abuse of suspects as follows: Miranda forces the police to tell suspects up front that they can stop the questioning if they wish and can call on a lawyer if they need help. Edwards in turn tells the police that they will pay a heavy price if the suspect calls for help ... [T] his gives police a strong incentive to avoid the kinds of tactics that are likely to lead suspects to seek a lawyer's assistance, because those tactics will be counterproductive. 3 ' By giving the suspect the power to determine for himself under what circumstances he needs the assistance of counsel, that is, whether the police tactics used constitute abuse or not, the Edwards rule both relieves the courts from making that determination and discourages police from engaging in abusive tactics that will induce 
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[Vol. 82 the accused to implement his right to counsel. 3 2 Thus, together Miranda and Edwards effectively protect suspects from the often severe physical abuse they received from police before the decisions. 3 3 However, these decisions have also given police incentives to use trickery and deceptive tactics to obtain confessions from defendants. 3 4 When these non-abusive tactics cross the line and become coercive making confessions inadmissible has been the newest problem the Court must address. Also, the Court must grapple with the issue of the validity of waivers of rights when an accused is subjected to such psychological tactics. S. 412 (1986) (accused in custody not told that his lawyer had tried to reach him); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (knowing that the accused was very religious, police commented to him how the victim deserved a "Christian burial" to get accused to take them to the body).
35 Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 488 (1990 The FBI report of the interview says that Minnick was read his Miranda rights and that he acknowledged and understood those rights. 4 7 Minnick did discuss with the agents the jail break and the flight to Mexico. 48 However, when questioned about the two murders, Minnick refused to answer and invoked his right to have counsel present. 4 9 According to the report, "Minnick stated 'Come back Monday when I have a lawyer,' and stated that he would make a more complete statement then with his lawyer present." 50 The interview then ended. 51 An attorney was later appointed to represent Minnick. Minnick spoke with his attorney two or three times, although the record is unclear as to whether these conversations were in person or by telephone. 5 2 Minnick's attorney told him not to answer any questions or sign any statements. 70 Id. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court held that interrogation "must cease until an attorney is present" and that an accused has a right to have an attorney "present during any subsequent questioning." 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) . See supra text accompanying notes 17-28. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court stated, "when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation." 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981 
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[Vol. 82 the application of substantive rights by providing "clear and unequivocal" guidance to police, prosecutors and courts. 73 The Court concluded that these benefits of Edwards outweigh the burdens Miranda imposes on law enforcement officials by requiring the suppression of probative evidence under certain circumstances.
74
The Court also discussed the misinterpretation of Edwards by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The state court focused on the statement in Edwards that an accused "is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him. . . ."75 However, the Court placed this phrase, isolated by the Mississippi court, back into context and stated that "a fair reading of Edwards and subsequent cases" shows that the rule prohibits policeinitiated interrogation "unless the accused has counsel with him at the time of questioning. ' 76 Based on their reading of Edwards, the Court directly held that "when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney., ' 77 The Court rejected the respondent's proposed exception to Edwards that would remove protection from police-initiated interrogations if an accused has previously consulted with an attorney. 7 8 The Court reasoned that Minnick's "isolated consultations" with counsel did not protect him from the "coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged." 79 The Court also believed that consultations with counsel may "not always [be] In dissent Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, believed the Court established an "irrebuttable presumption" that a suspect can never validly waive his Miranda right to counsel after already invoking them. 92 Justice Scalia contended that the Constitution does not call for this expansion of the Edwards rule. According to Justice Scalia, the Court's ruling that Minnick's confession must be suppressed as a "systemic assurance" 94 against the pressures of custody is an unauthorized "incursion upon state practices" since the suppression is not based on constitutionally recog- prove under Zerbst that such a right was waived.' 0 5 The Court defines too broadly the "certain circumstances" in which waiver will be presumed involuntary. 10 6 The only legitimate circumstances, according to Justice Scalia, would be the same situation as found in Edwards itself.' 0 7 Stressing the second part of the Zerbst standard, that the suspect must "intelligently" waive his rights, Justice Scalia would draw the "bright-line" rule at the time a suspect speaks with counsel. 1 0 8 After a consultation with an attorney the suspect has a "heightened awareness" of his rights and the Edwards exclusionary rule should cease to apply.1 0 9 Justice Scalia maintained that if during post-consultation the police threaten or coerce a suspect into confessing, the Zerbst standard of "voluntarily and knowingly" will protect the suspect's rights and result in the suppression of any coerced confession. 1" 0 This "clear and simple" rule would have all the advantages of the Court's expansion of Edwards, but would not harshly constrict law enforcement efforts during criminal investigations. I 1I Finally, Justice Scalia philosophized that to allow an honest confession to be viewed as a mistake that should be suppressed is detrimental both to the suspect and society." i 2 In Justice Scalia's opinion, a confession to a crime "advances the goals of both 'justice and rehabilitation' " and the Court's "misguided" decision abandons these principles.' "3
V. ANALYSIS
The opinions in Minnick demonstrate the different views the Justices hold regarding both the practical realities of custodial interrogation and the theoretical justifications for protection of suspects and society. These divergent viewpoints have led the Court away from the bright-line rules of Miranda and Edwards into a chaotic case-by-case analysis of Miranda rights issues. This type of ad hoc reasoning has weakened and limited the rights of suspects in custo- This Note argues that the Court should address the many problems left by the Miranda caselaw, including Minnick, by making custodial confessions inadmissible unless made in the presence of an attorney. After analyzing how the rule solves the problems of the custodial confession caselaw and refuting criticism of the rule, this Note concludes that such a rule best solves the problems created by the Court's ad hoc treatment of custodial confessions.
A. THE COURT'S GRADUAL BLURRING OF MIRANDA 'S BRIGHT-LINE
One of the principle goals of the Miranda and Edwards Courts was to provide clear guidance to police and lower courts as to what tactics constitute coercion rendering confessions inadmissible. However, the bright-line of these decisions has been blurred. The Court has allowed admissions of statements for purposes of impeachment when Miranda warnings were not given to the suspect,' 1 4 incriminating statements made after police discuss the case within hearing of a suspect as long as police can claim they did not reasonably expect to elicit such statements, 1 1 5 and statements regarding more serious crimes after the suspect has only waived his right to silence for questioning about a lesser offense.
1 6 The suspect's right to silence does not bar further interrogation as long as police " 'scrupulously honor[ I' " the suspect's rights before they resume questioning. 1 7 Also, police are allowed to "cure" a confession by giving the Miranda warnings after an initial answer by a suspect, The Court has also created loopholes in the Miranda decision by tampering with the definition of "custody" itself. On one hand, the Court has held that several officers questioning a suspect in his bedroom at 4:00 a.m. was custodial interrogation. 20 Later, the Court declared that questioning by several IRS agents of a defendant at his home did not constitute "custody" requiring the procedures of Miranda. 12 1 However, an interview by an IRS agent of a defendant in jail on unrelated charges was deemed custodial.' 22 Also, the Court's inconsistency is shown by its decision that an ordered psychiatric examination of a defendant while in jail is custodial,1 23 even though an ordered appearance before a grand jury 12 4 and a required meeting with probation officer 25 do not constitute custody.
This type of erosion of Miranda's goal of protecting suspects from police overreaching also extends to the issue of validity of waivers. The Miranda Court applied the Zerbst standard of knowing and intelligent waiver to a suspect's waiver of the right of silence and the right to counsel. However, the Court has recently lessened the burden on the police to prove valid waivers of these rights. In Colorado v. Connelly, 12 6 for example, the Court ruled the defendant validly waived his rights despite the testimony of an examining psychiatrist that the defendant suffered from "command hallucinations" and was unable "to make free and rationale choices."' 12 7
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist apparently reasoned that if there was no police coercion then there was no violation of the suspect's rights and a valid waiver occurred. There is no indication that the Zerbst standard of waiver was even considered. The Court 118 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985) . 119 Statements made by a suspect will be admissible despite the suspect not being read his Miranda rights if there is some public danger present. New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649 (1984) . In Quarles, the defendant was arrested and handcuffed by several police in a convenience store late at night and was not read his rights even though there was only negligible danger to the public. In fact, the police tactics involved in Quarles probably would have been ruled coercive under pre-Miranda tests. In Minnick, the Justices revealed different opinions of what really happens during custodial interrogation. Justice Kennedy stressed the vulnerability of a suspect in custody and the need for the Court to insure suspects' rights:
A single consultation with an attorney does not remove the suspect from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights, or from the coercive pressures that accompany custody and that may increase as custody is prolonged. The case before us well illustrates the pressures, and abuses, that may be concomitants of custody.1 3 0
The majority recognized that police have a duty to try to make suspects talk. As one commentator notes, "[t]o induce a confession, an act that ordinarily runs against inclination and interest, [an interrogator] manipulates and deceives the suspect."' 13 1 The majority is not naive to the problems created by requiring police to inform suspects of their rights and protect those rights. As Professor Kamisar stated "when we expect police dutifully" to inform suspects of their rights, "we demand too much of even our best officers."' 132 The Court, therefore, views the realities of interrogation behind the stationhouse door with due skepticism since police conduct over the years may hardly be said to have inspired judicial confidence. 13 3 In contrast, Justice Scalia based his dissent in Minnick on an underlying belief that police conduct during custodial confessions is not as harsh and abusive as the Court contended. Justice Scalia stated:
[T]he Edwards rule rests upon an assumption similar to that of Miranda itself: that when a suspect in police custody is first questioned he is likely to be ignorant of his rights and to feel isolated in a hostile environment . . . After a suspect has seen his request for an attorney honored, however, and has actually spoken with that attorney... the suspect then knows that he has an advocate on his side, and that the police will permit him to consult that advocate. He almost certainly also has a heightened awareness . This view suggests that the dissent was unsympathetic to the claimed inherent pressures of custodial interrogation and Miranda's express warning that "[e]ven preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process."' 135 Justice Scalia also apparently believed that feelings of guilt motivate confessions more than custodial coercion by the police. The opinions in Minnick thus reflect the attitudes of the majority and dissent in Miranda in the way the Justices differ on the realities of custodial interrogation. For the majority in Miranda, Justice Warren referring to several police manuals on interrogation tactics concluded, " [t] hese tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already -that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged."' ' 36 Dissenting, Justice Harlan referred to police tactics as "minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation" that are merely "inconvenient and unpleasant for the suspect."' 137 Under these practical differences regarding custodial interrogation lay funda-mental theoretical differences between the majority and dissents evidenced by both Miranda and Minnick.
As Chief Justice Warren explained in Miranda, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government.., must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."' 38 Therefore, to the Miranda Court, any compulsion was improper because it did not comport with human dignity.' 3 9 ChiefJustice Warren continued that the custodial environment "carries its own badge of intimidation" that is as "equally destructive of human dignity" as physical abuse. 140 The Minnick Court echoes this theory by refusing to remove Edwards protection when a suspect has consulted with an attorney, but did not have counsel present during interrogation. Removal of protection, which then might "pass in and out" would lead to a "loss of respect for the underlying constitutional principle [s] . ' ' 14 1 In Miranda and Minnick, the dissents primarily based their opinions on the need for strong law enforcement to protect society and the morality of confessions. In Miranda Justice Harlan stated, "[s]ociety has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law." 1 4 2 Justice White emphasized the view that there is "nothing wrong or immoral" in police interrogation of suspects, even if subtly coercive.1 43 In Minnick, Justice Scalia stated that confessions are beneficial "[n]ot only for society, but for the wrongdoer himself, admission of guilt... if not coerced, is inherently desirable, because it advances the goals of both justice and rehabilitation."144 He concluded that "[t]o design our laws on premises contrary to these is to abandon belief in . . . the moral claim of just government to obedience."145
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MINNICK Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 492 (1990) . 142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 143 Id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). 144 Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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construction in a world of turbulent decisions fails to guarantee stability for suspects' rights. Minnick is indeed a creature of Miranda it has its reasoning and its problems.
As discussed previously, the goals of Miranda were to protect suspects from police abuse and coercion, to provide clear guidelines for police and lower courts regarding the admissibility of confessions and the validity of waivers, and finally, as a result of its per se rule, conserve judicial resources that had been used in making caseby-case determinations under the voluntariness test. Both proponents and opponents of the Miranda ruling agree that these goals have not been met. 14 6 As evidenced by the Court's inconsistent treatment of the Miranda line of cases, the per se presumptions of Miranda have given way in large part to a resurrected case-by-case analysis and a reemphasis on the voluntary nature of the confession instead of on police tactics. Several loopholes left by the Miranda Court, such as the definition of custody and the correct application and definitions of the Zerbst waiver standard, not only remain today but have become sinkholes which may completely swallow Miranda. Finally, the requirement that police be given the conflicting duties of both informing the suspect of his rights and of trying to make him give up those rights is problematic by its very nature.
In Minnick, the Court tried to prop up the falling Miranda and Edwards rules to again protect the rights of an accused and provide clear guidance to police and courts. The Minnick Court refused to limit the Edwards rule that police must stop interrogation when a suspect invokes his right to counsel. The Court strengthened the Edwards rule by holding that, not only must interrogation cease upon request for counsel, but "officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney."' 47 Further, the Court "insist[ed] that neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both particular and systemic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause."' 4 8 This holding creates a presumption that confessions are inadmissible unless police implement certain protective procedures. Minnick also goes further than Miranda and Edwards by expressly requiring an attorney's presence to commence reinterrogation. The Court's decision seems to pro-146 See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 129; Stuntz, supra note 31, at 820-21; Schuihofer, supra note 17; Stephen J. Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering M'iranda," 54 U. Chi. L.Rev. 938, 949 (1987) vide a clear guideline for police and courts to follow while at the same time protecting suspects from police coercion. Even the most notorious police interrogator will hesitate before engaging in overreaching coercive tactics when the suspect's attorney is in the room. Also, courts will not have to delve into the contents of consultations between attorneys and clients in order to determine if the suspect had enough information to "knowingly and intelligently" waive his rights. This not only conserves judicial resources, but also avoids attorney-client privilege problems as the Court points out.
14 9
Although the Court's decision in Minnick does not, as do several recent decisions, erode the protections guaranteed suspects in Miranda and Edwards, it fails to provide a solid solution to the many problems of Miranda caselaw. While expressly calling for the presence of counsel in order for the police to reinitiate interrogation, the Minnick holding excepts from this protection instances where the accused has reinitiated discussions with police. This suspect reinitiation exception does nothing to address the Court's primary problems since Miranda: When do police tactics become coercion? And when is a waiver valid?
Deciding if the suspect was coerced into reinitiating discussions with police will often be very difficult. Not all coercive tactics will be as blatant as the police telling Minnick that his lawyer was "nothing" and that he "had to talk." 15 0 The Court will have to engage in a case-by-case analysis of what went on behind the stationhouse door, which will often be impossible to completely determine. This inability to determine whether the suspect was coerced into reinitiating talks with the police makes impossible the determination of whether that reinitiation counts as a valid waiver under the Zerbst "knowingly and intelligently waived" standard.
Also, both the majority and dissent in Minnick engaged in a balancing of the suspect's rights and the need for police questioning in criminal investigations, despite Miranda's explicit rejection of any balancing tests. The majority and dissent obviously gave different weight to the factors to be balanced. The majority's emphasis on the vulnerable suspect in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custody is completely contrary to the dissent's vision of the "heightened awareness" of suspects who have been read their rights and have consulted with counsel. These different views indicate the split in the Court as to the correct "realities" and philosophies of custodial interrogation. Such a split of opinion diminishes clear guide- 149 Id. 150 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 46, at 22. lines sent by the Court to police and lower courts because which viewpoint will prevail in any given case is unclear. The Court's swinging from one perspective to the other in its case-by-case analysis will only increase as new Justices Souter and Thomas enter the debate.
The problems created by the Court's reluctance to follow the per se rules of Miranda, Edwards and possibly in the future, Minnick are great. The caselaw dealing with suspects' rights is as confusing today as it was before Miranda. Police do not have "clear and unequivocal" guidelines to follow. In fact, the Court's decisions may have encouraged police to adopt procedures in the gray area between compulsion and investigation, since it is unclear what will be allowed. The loopholes allowing waivers of the right to counsel and right of silence result in the Court having to determine the validity of those waivers on a case-by-case "totality of circumstances" basis. The Zerbst standard that waivers must be knowingly and intelligently waived is easily manipulated depending on the practical and theoretical viewpoints of the members of the majority in any given case.
Therefore, a more comprehensive approach to the problems of Miranda and the cases that are its legacy is necessary to fully protect the constitutional rights of suspects during custodial interrogation. Minnick is a step in the right direction, but what is needed is a leap toward absolute protection of suspects' rights under the Constitution.
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE INADMISSIBILITY OF CUSTODIAL

CONFESSIONS UNLESS MADE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN
ATTORNEY
A. THE PROBLEMS OF CUSTODIAL CONFESSIONS
Several solutions for the problems in the current law of custodial confessions have been proposed over the years. A few of these procedures are simply technical cures' 5 ' not really getting at the issue -the need to protect suspects from coercive pressures to speak, while still allowing truly voluntary confessions to be given. Other proposals attempt to restructure the legal process to provide 151 These cures include giving suspects a cooling off period in which to rethink their decision to either confess or remain silent, allowing neutral observers from the community to be present during interrogations, and more strictly enforcing prompt arraignment statutes. See generally, Caplan, supra note 131, at 1464, 1474. These proposed solutions cannot seriously impact on the underlying problems of custodial confessions because they fail to protect suspects from coercion during the cooling off period or before arraignment and because neutral observers will not know if suspects are correctly informed of their rights.
whether the suspect really understood the warnings read to him by the police. With an attorney present to explain at length, if necessary, an accused's constitutional rights and to make sure that those rights are truly "knowingly and intelligently" waived, the validity of waivers no longer poses a manipulable loophole for the police and courts to use to run around the Constitution. The rule presumes that the suspect was adequately informed of his rights by counsel and then in the presence of counsel "knowingly and intelligently" waives his rights and confesses to police. Counsel's presence at the confession stage is critical because he can continue to clarify the suspect's understanding of his rights throughout the questioning period.
Finally, this rule gives the clear and unequivocal guidance to police and courts that the Miranda Court so strived for, yet without the loopholes associated with case-by-case analysis. Police have no incentive to coerce suspects, either with subtle tricks or blatant physical abuse, because no statement made by the suspect under such circumstances are admissible. Also, the attorney's presence as a requirement of admissibility is straightforward and unmanipulable by the courts. Such clear guidelines, therefore, conserve judicial resources. Courts are freed from collateral Miranda issues, such as the validity of waivers, and able to spend more time addressing other issues on their overcrowded dockets.
B.
RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THIS RULE As with any rule, this rule requiring the presence of counsel in order for a suspect's statement to be admissible is not without criticism. The three major criticisms of this rule are: (1) it will eliminate all confessions -both voluntary and coerced; (2) the presence of counsel does not presumptively mean the suspect will be adequately informed of his rights and will "knowingly and intelligently" be able to waive them; and (3) it will be impractical, if not impossible, to implement. These criticisms can be effectively refuted, thereby securing the rule as a valid alternative to the present law of custodial confessions.
Many scholars view the presence of counsel as preventing any and all confessions to the police. 31, 35 (No. 4 1988 ) ("Once a lawyer enters upon an interrogation scene, he will very rarely do anything more than instruct his client to keep his mouth shut.").
than they currently receive from police is extremely small. The presumption remains that most lawyers will adequately inform the suspect of their rights, strengthening the validity of any waiver of those rights.
A third criticism of such a rule is that it is impractical -that public defenders are already overworked, that it would cost an unreasonable amount of money and that there are times when it is impossible to get an attorney to the stationhouse. Granted, public defenders are already overburdened, however this rule does not need to add to their burdens. Other attorneys, or even law students with 7-11 licenses, could sit in on the questioning of the suspect. This could also be done on a voluntary, pro bono basis, thereby keeping extra costs at a minimum. And finally, it is irrelevant that an attorney may not be able to be present during the initial questioning of a suspect. According to the rule, the police cannot use any confession made by a suspect against that person in court unless counsel was present when the statement was made. Initial questioning can therefore be postponed until an attorney is available. And, in cases where immediate questioning is necessary to stop an ongoing or to prevent an impending crime, police could question the witness after fully informing him of his rights. If the witness confesses at that time, he may repeat his confession in the presence of counsel. This still protects the suspect from coercion, since police will not coerce a suspect to get an initial inadmissible statement if they know he will refuse to make it later when fully informed of his rights and in the protective presence of counsel.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though the Court's decision in Minnick v. Mississippi correctly protects suspects' rights, it suffers from faulty reasoning and fails to address the major problems in the area of custodial confessions. The Court's treatment of Fifth Amendment rights issues under a weakened version of Miranda v. Arizona is unpredictable, causing confusion where there should be "clear and unequivocal guidelines."
The proposal to make all custodial confessions inadmissible unless made in the presence of counsel is supported by the Court's decisions in Miranda, Edwards and Minnick. Yet those cases do not go far enough and the Court's recent weakening of them has prevented Miranda's goal from being achieved. The rule proposed here achieves those goals; it ensures that suspects will be adequately informed of their rights and that they will not be coerced into confess-ing by the police. Therefore under this rule, any confessions made and admitted in court will involve an intelligent and knowing waiver of Fifth Amendment rights freely given by the accused.
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